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High economic growth in the new EU member states (at least 
in the so-called transition countries) for more than a decade 
and the region’s resultant strong real economic convergence 
path with the old EU member states (EU15) was without 
precedent. The extraordinarily high rate of growth can be at-
tributed to a special growth model which distinguishes the 
growth achievements of the region.1 The global fi nancial 
and economic crisis, however, hit most of the new member 
states (EU10) harder than other countries in the world, and 
post-crisis recovery has been generally slower than in other 
emerging economies. This raises questions about the re-
gion’s unique pre-crisis development model. This paper will 
address three main questions. First, what are the special fea-
tures of the EU10’s growth model that distinguish the growth 
achievements of the region? Second, can post-crisis recov-
ery and growth be achieved with the same growth model that 
was employed in the pre-crisis period, i.e. is the model sus-
tainable over the longer term? And fi nally, can the EU10 once 
again achieve faster growth than the EU15 and thus continue 
the convergence trend? If not, does the growth model need 
revisions or should it be replaced altogether?
In order to answer these questions, we provide a detailed 
analysis of the period following the transformational reces-
sion as a fi rst step. We review the development of poten-
* This research was carried out under the Bolyai János Kutatási Ösz-
töndíj programme of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
1 T. B e c k e r, D. D a i a n u , Z. D a r v a s , V. G l i g o ro v, M. L a n d e s m a n n , 
P. P e t ro v i c , J. P i s a n i - F e r r y, D. R o s a t i , A. S a p i r, B. We d e r  d i 
M a u ro : Whither growth in central and eastern Europe?, Policy lessons 
for an integrated Europe, Bruegel Blueprint Series, Vol. XI, 2010; R. Atoy-
an: Beyond the Crisis: Revisiting Emerging Europe’s Growth Model, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/10/92, 2010; S. F a b r i z i o , D. L e i g h , A. M o d y : The 
Second Transition, in: European Economy, No. 366, March 2009.
tial growth in the EU10, applying a production function ap-
proach and growth accounting.2 The analysis is based on 
the AMECO and the EPC’s Output Gap Working Group da-
tabases. We formed three subgroups within the EU10, taking 
geographic location and development paths and structures 
into account as classifi cation criteria: the Central European 
countries (CE5), consisting of the Czech Republic (CZ), Hun-
gary (HU), Poland (PL), Slovenia (SL) and Slovakia (SK); the 
Baltic countries (B3), made up of Estonia (EE), Lithuania (LT) 
and Latvia (LV); and the South-eastern European countries 
(SE2), Bulgaria (BG) and Romania (RO). The next step is to 
identify the common features of the region’s growth perfor-
mance and construct a theoretical model (a system of com-
mon features). After that we will examine how the crisis af-
fected this growth model.
Pre-crisis development of potential growth and its 
factors
The rate of potential growth increased in the EU10 in the 
years following the transformation crisis (see Table 1). In sum, 
we can state that the dominant factors of the EU10’s poten-
tial growth were capital accumulation and the improvement 
of the total factor productivity. The dynamism of the latter, 
however, had almost halved even before the onset of the fi -
nancial crisis.
The main potential growth features in the years preceding 
the 2008-2009 crisis were the following:
• Having got through the transformation crisis (from 
1996 onwards), the average rate of potential growth in 
2 For methodological details see C. D e n i s , D. G re n o u i l l e a u , K. M c -
M o r ro w, W. R ö g e r : Calculating potential growth rates and output 
gaps – a revised production function approach, European Economy 
Economic Papers, No. 247, European Commission, 2006; F. D ’ A u r i a , 
C. D e n i s , K. H a v i k , K. M c M o r ro w, C. P l a n a s , R. R a c i b o r s k i , 
W. R ö g e r, A. R o s s i : The production function methodology for cal-
culating potential growth rates and output gaps, European Economy 
Economic Papers, No. 420, July 2010. 
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pact on the countries concerned. This dynamism may 
exceed the EU10 average in the countries starting off 
at a lower level of development. However, total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth dynamism had already de-
creased before the outbreak of the fi nancial and eco-
nomic crisis. (In the period 2003-2008, the decrease 
of TFP growth was compensated for by robust foreign 
capital infl ows and a temporary increase in the contri-
bution by capital accumulation.) At the same time, the 
drop in TFP growth was continuous and seemingly un-
stoppable in the EU15 countries, too. TFP is a decisive 
structural factor of long-run productivity. The depletion 
of TFP growth had already foreshadowed the erosion 
of the European growth potential before the outbreak 
of the crisis.
The pre-crisis growth model
Compared to other emerging regions, the EU integration an-
chor seems to be the most important distinguishing factor 
of the EU10’s growth model. There are two main channels 
through which integration has exercised its infl uence: fi rst, 
the prospect of integration increased confi dence in EU10 
economies and reduced their perceived risk; second, the 
countries committed themselves to European norms, which 
contributed to an improvement of economic effi ciency.
International fi nancial integration
Investment and overall capital deepening was one of the 
most important factors of high potential growth in the EU10 
countries. Their entry into the EU was accompanied by the 
liberalisation of their capital markets, which led to extensive 
capital fl ows. Foreign banks that established subsidiaries 
and branches in the region served as conduits of foreign 
capital for extensive lending to domestic businesses and 
households. As macroeconomic conditions improved, coun-
try risks decreased, so the region’s countries (and larger cor-
the EU10 was above the EU15 average. This demon-
strates signifi cant catching-up performance and the 
advancement of real convergence.
• There are signifi cant differences within the EU10 (see 
Table 1). Potential growth of the CE5 countries was 
close to the EU10 average throughout the entire ex-
amined period. The growth performance of the B3 
countries was outstanding through 2007; indeed, they 
exceeded the EU10 average by more than 50% in cer-
tain years. The SE2 countries did not exceed the EU10 
average until 2003, as transformation and macroeco-
nomic problems limited their catching up until that 
time. The dynamism of their potential output exceeded 
the EU10 and CE5 averages.
• Until 2004, labour’s contribution to potential GDP in the 
EU10 was negative. This was mainly due to the deep 
structural changes. As regards structural unemploy-
ment (NAIRU), the change took place in the reverse 
direction. The growth of structural unemployment was 
especially high in B3 and SE2 countries through 2003.
• Contribution of capital correlates strongly with the de-
velopment of the investment rate. The increasing level 
of the latter in the EU10 is mainly the result of foreign 
capital infl ow. Having got through the transformation 
crisis, the integration “anchor” played a decisive role 
in increasing the capital-attracting ability of the coun-
tries concerned. There was a strong increase in capital 
accumulation, too – its contribution to potential GDP 
since 2005 had the highest ratio.
• Total factor productivity can rise at an unusually high 
rate during a period of transition to a market economy 
(this is known as transition buoyancy). The strong Eu-
ropean adaptation process (institutionalisation and ac-
tivating the “integration anchor”) has had a similar im-
Table 1
Pre-crisis development of potential growth and its factors 
in %
Source: own calculation.
Potential Growth
Contribution of different factors to potential growth
Labour Capital TFP
1996 2000 2004 2007 1996 2000 2004 2007 1996 2000 2004 2007 1996 2000 2004 2007
EU15 2.1 2.5 2.0 1.8 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.6
EU10 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.5 -0.3 -1.0 0.1 0.7 1.7 1.8 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.3 1.6
CE5 3.8 3.2 3.8 4.3 -0.3 -1.1 0.1 0.8 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.6
B3 3.5 3.9 6.5 5.8 -1 -1.1 0.9 0.4 1.3 1.9 3.0 3.8 3.2 3.1 2.5 1.5
SE2 2.3 2.9 4.3 5.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.8 3.3 1.6 2.4 2.8 1.8
EU27 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.7
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in labour supply caused by structural changes in these 
economies. As Table 1 shows, the contribution of labour 
has had a positive sign and has been signifi cant since 2005 
(0.5-0.7% of potential GDP). At the same time, the increase in 
labour productivity slowed down. Structural unemployment 
increased until 2003 and then declined by 3.7% by 2008.
In the B3 countries, the faster labour productivity growth far 
exceeded the decreasing contribution of labour until 2002. 
The increase in the structural unemployment rate was dra-
matic: it rose from 5% to 12.9% by 2002. The trend reversed 
in 2003, and the NAIRU declined to 8.7%. From 2003 to 2007 
the high rate of labour productivity growth was accompanied 
by a rise in labour’s contribution to potential GDP (0.4-1.1% 
per year). In the SE2 countries, labour’s contribution to po-
tential GDP decreased until 2006, but this was compensated 
for by the improving productivity. Structural unemployment 
increased until 2003 (from 6.8% to 8.8%) and then decreased 
through 2008, when it was at 7.1%.
TFP growth
A 2008 World Bank study highlights TFP’s decisive role in 
the region’s growth.4 While it is true that in the period 1995-
2005 the EU10 had the third-highest TFP growth in the world 
(after China and the Commonwealth of Independent States), 
our analysis shows that there was a remarkable decrease in 
TFP’s contribution to potential growth. It dropped from 2.4% 
in 2000 to 1.3% in 2008 (see Table 1). Therefore, we can ar-
gue that in the most successful period of convergence (2004-
2008), it was capital and not TFP that drove the growth.
In the fi rst years of the B3 region’s transition to a market 
economy, the contribution of total factor productivity in-
creased notably, exceeding 3% per year in the period 1996-
2001 before gradually decreasing to 1.1% by 2008. The TFP 
increase in the SE2 region picked up only at the end of the 
1990s once the market economy there had grown more de-
veloped.
External liberalisation
The EU10 can be characterised by a very high degree of 
external liberalisation. Trade opening occurred relatively 
quickly in the region. The new member states followed the 
globalisation trend: trade growth was faster than produc-
tion growth. In 1995 the ratio of trade (exports and imports) 
to GDP was below 100% in half of the examined countries. 
By 2007 only two such countries (Poland and Romania) re-
mained. Growth of the trade-to-GDP ratio surpassed 20% in 
nine countries. Openness is also refl ected in market shares, 
4 World Bank: Unleashing Prosperity – Productivity Growth in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, Washington DC 2008.
porations) were able to borrow on international capital mar-
kets at increasingly lower spreads. Consequently, fi nancing 
costs signifi cantly decreased (often below the economically 
justifi ed level). As a result of the signifi cant capital infl ow, the 
contribution of capital to potential growth in the EU10 in-
creased from 1.7% in 1996 to 2.2% in 2007 (see Table 1). The 
investment rate also increased signifi cantly, from just over 
20% to 27.4% by 2008.
The investment rate in the CE5 countries approaches the 
average of the EU10. The rate was moderately higher than 
the EU10 average until 2002, after which it began to lag be-
hind (see Table 1). The investment rate in the B3 countries in-
creased over this time period due to the particularly high rate 
of capital infl ow – from 15.3% in 1996 to 26.6% in 2004. The 
contribution of capital accumulation rose from 1.3% to 3.0% 
in the same period in this region. EU accession, the declining 
risk premium and the favourable international investment en-
vironment resulted in an exceptionally high investment ratio. 
This ratio rose to 35% by 2007, and the contribution of capital 
increased to 3.8%. Capital infl ow provided full compensation 
for the declining transition buoyancy of total factor productiv-
ity in the B3 countries.
Capital accumulation was an important factor in improving 
labour productivity in the SE2 countries. The rate of capital 
accumulation – just 16% – at the end of the 1990s was with-
out precedent, even if we take into account the low devel-
opment level of these countries. A low level of foreign capi-
tal infl ow was one of the most important explaining factors. 
Therefore, the contribution of capital remained low in this pe-
riod (about 0.8% per year). Concurrent with the EU adapta-
tion process, the investment ratio grew quickly beginning in 
2000. In 2004 it was above the EU10 average, and by 2008 it 
had reached the extraordinarily high level of 37.4%. Capital’s 
contribution exceeded 3% of potential GDP in this period, 
making it the most important potential growth factor in the 
SE2 countries between 2006 and 2008.
Human capital
The low relative unit labour costs and relatively well-educat-
ed human capital made the EU10 region attractive to foreign 
investors. This led to rapid technology transfer, access to 
high-income markets and the possibility of integrating into 
cross-border production networks.3 All of these factors re-
sulted in improved labour productivity.
The rising rate of potential growth through 2005 can be ex-
plained exclusively by this labour productivity increase. The 
dynamism of labour productivity far exceeded the decrease 
3 M.A. L a n d e s m a n n : Which Growth Model for Central and Eastern 
Europe after the Crisis?, FIW Policy Brief, No. 4, 2010.
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economic risks and complicate macroeconomic manage-
ment.
While the infl ow of foreign direct investment (FDI) was a key 
driver of economic growth in the EU10 region, the composi-
tion of FDI was not always favourable. In particular, the share 
fl owing to manufacturing, the key sector for developing ex-
port potential, was signifi cant only in the CE5. To the extent 
that foreign investment was (at least partly) channelled into 
consumption and housing loans, one cannot exclude the 
possibility of a misallocation of resources. Resources were 
diverted away from investment in the tradable sector, which 
was bound to negatively affect competitiveness and growth. 
Therefore, fi nancial deepening fuelled the absorption-led 
growth and exacerbated the (often already pronounced) 
non-tradable sector bias in the structure of the most vulner-
able economies.7
Other investment fl ows (mostly constituting cross-border 
loans) were more volatile, but in the peak years before the 
fi nancial crisis, their magnitude even exceeded FDI infl ows. 
EU accession and the prospect of joining the single currency 
signifi cantly mitigated the risk premia. In the new member 
states, the sovereign credit risk ratings continued to improve 
both before and after accession.8 The process often led to 
negative real interest rates, especially when accompanied by 
strong infl ation and rapid credit expansion. The abundant, 
but ultimately unsustainable, capital infl ows that bridged in-
creasing gaps between spending and incomes fuelled credit 
booms and resulted in the accumulation of foreign liabilities.9 
What is more, the credit boom fostered primarily domestic 
demand, which is associated with the overheating of the 
economies.
The pre-crisis credit growth process in the region has been 
extensively studied in the literature. Several empirical stud-
ies suggest that from the perspective of infl ationary pressure 
and macroeconomic stability, it is not the level but the rate 
of credit growth that matters. Rapid credit growth can fuel 
consumption and feed infl ation and wage growth, which can 
erode competitiveness and contribute to current account 
defi cits and the build-up of external debt. Consequently, the 
external vulnerability of the countries in question increases.
The rapid credit expansion and capital infl ow in the non-
tradable sectors (especially housing) might change the com-
position of fi nal demand. As a result, a signifi cant change in 
the real exchange rate might occur. Real appreciation and 
the external defi cit might become excessive due to the un-
7 R .  A t o y a n , op. cit.
8 P. H a l m a i , V. V á s á r y : Real convergence …, op. cit.
9 For details see e.g. R. A t o y a n , op. cit.; T. B e c k e r, D. D a i a n u , Z. 
D a r v a s , V. G l i g o ro v, M. L a n d e s m a n n , P. P e t ro v i c , J. P i s a n i -
F e r r y, D. R o s a t i , A. S a p i r, B. We d e r  d i  M a u ro , op. cit.
and this is a region-specifi c feature. The market share of the 
region has increased in spite of the rapid appreciation of its 
national currencies. This can be traced back to deep overall 
structural reforms. The rise in exports was due to technologi-
cal development and quality improvement. The EU10 coun-
tries were generally much more open than other emerging 
regions or the EU15. However, there were large differences 
between the country groups. The CE5 group turned out to 
be successful in this opening process, as it did not gener-
ate strong structural imbalances (in trade and current ac-
counts or in growing private sector savings-investment gaps) 
prior to the crisis. This was quite different in the B3 and SE2 
groups, where unsustainable imbalances developed due to 
the historical weaknesses of the tradable sectors, choices 
made with regard to exchange rate regimes, the importance 
of remittances and because of missing instruments to deal 
with cross-border fi nancial market integration.5
Catching-up potential
Liberalisation and openness in external economic relations 
coincided with a classic process of convergence. Growth 
rates in the region were substantially above those of their 
western neighbours, even though these catching-up pro-
cesses were at times interrupted by economic policy mis-
steps or by misalignments of wages and productivity.6
Sustainability challenges
The previous section suggests a link between the region’s 
growth model and the build-up of vulnerabilities and inherent 
challenges. These vulnerabilities and challenges may call in-
to question the sustainability of the EU10 growth model. The 
rapid rate of growth was achieved at the expense of an ac-
cumulation of large external liabilities, which spilled over into 
large current account defi cits. Moreover, there were several 
transitional elements of growth. With this in mind, we now of-
fer an overview of the aforementioned vulnerabilities follow-
ing the factors of the pre-crisis growth model.
Net capital infl ow
Capital infl ow and credit expansion were crucial drivers of 
economic growth but also key factors in the region’s vulner-
ability. While capital infl ows to emerging markets generally 
boost growth, signalling market confi dence in the fundamen-
tals of economy, sudden surges can also create fi nancial and 
5 For details see M.A. L a n d e s m a n n , op. cit.
6 For details see e.g. P. H a l m a i , V. V á s á r y : Real convergence in the 
new Member States of the European Union: Shorter and longer term 
prospects, in: The European Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, 2010, pp. 229-253; P. H a l m a i , V. V á s á r y : Convergence Crisis? 
Economic Crisis and Convergence in the European Union, in: International 
Economics and Economic Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2012, pp. 297-322.
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gal and behavioural changes. As a consequence of this in-
tegration process, all of the EU10 countries achieved deep 
fi nancial and trade integration with the EU. The export dyna-
mism of the region decreased after accession, and domes-
tic demand (fuelled by cheap credit) grew in importance, re-
sulting in severe imbalances. In small open economies, only 
export-oriented growth can be sustainable in the long run. 
Due to the region’s general openness, the sharp slowdown 
in their export markets during the crisis is a major reason for 
output recession. As a result, the region’s current accounts 
dramatically worsened.
Catching-up process
We have already seen that many EU10 countries had be-
come increasingly vulnerable before the fi nancial crisis, in-
dicating that the region’s pre-crisis growth model is unsus-
tainable. Catching-up is necessarily accompanied by real 
appreciation. However, if it exceeds its equilibrium level, the 
economy will overheat, causing unit labour costs to rise and 
competitiveness to decrease. Wage increases exceeding the 
level of productivity improvement cannot be sustained over 
the long term. There is no doubt that the drastically reduced 
potential growth of the new member states over the medium-
term period will have important consequences for their real 
economic convergence to the EU average.
Potential growth after the fi nancial crisis
The EU10 countries were particularly hard hit by the crisis. 
The strong impact of the crisis on the region can be mainly 
attributed to “built-in” vulnerabilities: unprecedented current 
account imbalances in a number of EU10 countries before 
the crisis, rapid credit expansion, asset bubbles in non-trad-
able sectors, rapid real exchange rate appreciation, a lack 
of fl exibility in the countries with fi xed exchange rates, the 
strong reliance on external infl ows of capital, large debts de-
justifi ed overly optimistic expectations of economic agents 
and ill-advised economic policies.10 Taking into account the 
“built-in” vulnerabilities (rapid credit growth in the private 
sector leading to strong real effective exchange rate appre-
ciation and large current account defi cits), we can argue that 
these might have resulted in a slowdown even without the 
crisis.
Labour and TFP
Real appreciation adversely affected the cost competitive-
ness of potential growth’s labour component. There was a 
signifi cant increase in structural unemployment, and rigidi-
ties in the labour market became apparent. These develop-
ments may all contribute to the permanent destruction of hu-
man capital and thus further losses to the level of potential 
growth.
The strong TFP growth in the region can be partly attributed 
to transitional factors such as the institutional changes com-
pelled by EU integration. Therefore, this level of growth is 
not sustainable over the longer term. What is more, due to 
a number of factors, e.g. the slower pace of productivity-en-
hancing structural reforms, rigidities in the economy, corrup-
tion and an absence of innovation, there were clear signs of a 
slowdown in TFP growth even before the fi nancial crisis. The 
crisis itself and the resulting fi nancial constraints further ac-
centuated these signs, though signifi cant differences among 
the countries persist.
External openness
EU integration was one of the most important elements of 
the region’s growth model. The vision of EU integration and 
EU accession talks drove reform and yielded institutional, le-
10  R. A t o y a n , op. cit.
Table 2
Post-crisis development of potential growth and its factors
in %
Source: own calculation.
Potential growth
Contribution of different factors to potential growth
Labour Capital TFP
2009 2011 2013 2016 2009 2011 2013 2016 2009 2011 2013 2016 2009 2011 2013 2016
EU15 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
EU10 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2
CE5 3.2 2.4 2.2 2.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.1 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2
B3 0.6 0.3 2.3 2.1 -1.0 -1.4 0.1 -0.4 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.2
SE2 2.7 1.8 2.2 2.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.1
EU27 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7
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tween their rates of potential growth was 2.2-2.7% in 
the years preceding the crisis, it will decline to nearly 
1% by 2016. All of these factors demonstrate the un-
sustainable nature of the EU10’s pre-crisis growth 
model. The catching-up potential of the EU10 has sig-
nifi cantly decreased, and the strong dynamism of real 
convergence observed since 2003 has moderated to 
about 40% of its former level.
• Large differences can be observed with regard to the 
performance of country subgroups. The decline of the 
CE5 group leaves it somewhat off the EU10 average, 
while the drop in the performance of the B3 group in 
the crisis years has been dramatic. These tendencies 
underline the importance of avoiding vulnerability (es-
pecially with regard to current account imbalances). 
The vulnerability of the B3 and SE2 countries may 
explain their dramatically declining rates of potential 
growth. (We should mention that although Hungary 
belongs to the CE5, it is characterised by similar vul-
nerability and unfavourable potential growth perfor-
mance.) Finally, we argue that since the outbreak of the 
crisis, no convergence can be observed in the vulner-
able EU10 countries relative to the more developed EU 
member states, indicating a convergence crisis.
• Structural unemployment moderately increases in the 
EU10 countries (see Figure 1). Labour’s contribution is 
negative again, and the B3 countries have the worst ra-
tios in this regard.
• The decline of the investment ratio is extraordinary, es-
pecially in the B3 and SE2 countries (see Figure 1). The 
reversal of foreign capital infl ow and the necessary ad-
justment of the current account was accompanied in 
nominated in foreign currencies and fi scal policies that were 
often too loose.
There were two main channels through which the fi nancial 
crisis infl uenced the performance of the EU10: trade and fi -
nancial integration. First, the fall in foreign demand for EU10 
exports (demand-side factors) is a major reason for output 
recession. Second, the massive foreign capital infl ows sud-
denly stopped or even reversed. Investment levels dropped, 
which in combination with a wave of bankruptcies and eco-
nomic restructuring led to a reduction of capital stock and a 
lowering of potential growth in the short and medium run. In 
the long run, the negative implications of the crisis on invest-
ment may continue if the cost of capital remains permanently 
higher due to changed risk perceptions. All of these factors 
may have unfavourable effects on investment, especially 
with regard to intangible investments (e.g. R&D. Such a de-
crease may have signifi cant impacts on the growth of TFP 
and output. On the other hand, structural unemployment 
may further increase as a result of the hysteresis effect.11 The 
consequence may be potential growth which is well below 
the former rate. The medium-term effects (i.e. until 2016) of 
the crisis on potential growth and its factors as regards the 
examined countries are given in Table 2.
The main features of potential growth in the EU10 in the cri-
sis years and in the medium-term following the crisis can be 
summarised in the following points:
• The rate of potential output growth has been decreas-
ing since the onset of the fi nancial crisis. At the same 
time, the additional dynamism of the EU10 relative to 
the EU15 is also decreasing; while the difference be-
11 See Blanchard et al., 1989.
Figure 1
Pre- and post-crisis development of the investment 
ratio
Figure 2
Contribution of capital to potential output growth
in %
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permanent increase in capital costs and a lower level of TFP. 
We argue that the EU10 countries need a new growth model 
and the changes referred to above should inevitably be ad-
dressed when shaping the new model.
This should be done along three guidelines. First, domestic 
savings in the EU10 should be increased. This would mitigate 
the external vulnerability of the countries in question. Note, 
however, that an upward adjustment of domestic savings 
rates may result in a drop in domestic demand. Second, radi-
cal structural reforms (aimed at increasing potential growth) 
are needed. Labour’s negative contribution trend in particular 
should be addressed. A more fl exible labour supply and an 
improved capital accumulation ability may result in increased 
TFP levels. At the same time, however, successful structural 
reforms may further increase the region’s attractiveness for 
capital infl ows, which could lead to the same macroeconom-
ic problems the EU10 had before the crisis. Third, the EU10 
should pursue more balanced economic growth. As growth 
has been driven mainly by large absorption booms, a signifi -
cant rebalancing towards greater reliance on tradable sec-
tors is needed.
In sum, we can argue that the growth (and catching-up) 
model of the new member states that worked in the past is 
not sustainable any more. Strengthening or reviving potential 
growth and the catching-up potential requires broad struc-
tural reforms. European integration may provide an anchor, 
as it can facilitate growth-promoting structural reforms and 
sustainable public fi nance through the development of in-
stitutional mechanisms. However, in addition to the inter-
nal problems of European integration, the “reform fatigue” 
characterising the societies of the new member states and 
the “new populism” in economic policy makes it harder to 
achieve meaningful reforms.
certain cases by a decrease exceeding 20% of actual 
growth. In parallel to the decreasing accumulation of 
capital, capital’s contribution to potential growth also 
declined remarkably. The growth accounting indicates 
that this factor contributed the most to the post-crisis 
decline of potential growth in the EU10 (see Figure 2).
• The unfavourable development of total factor produc-
tivity further reinforces the negative trends described 
above (see Figure 3). Its “transition buoyancy” had al-
ready slowed down at the time of accession. The ero-
sion of this structurally important productivity factor 
has continued in the post-crisis period. This in turn is 
an unfavourable trend as regards the future growth and 
catching up possibilities of the EU10 countries.
Prospects: towards a new growth model?
Several policy suggestions emerge from the preceding 
analysis. It is evident that the pre-crisis growth model can-
not ensure the required level of growth. A revised or an en-
tirely new growth model may be needed for the region. As we 
have seen, none of the factors of potential growth will reach 
their pre-crisis levels in the medium term (see Figure 4 for a 
summary). The risk of a structural break in the growth condi-
tions is high. Recovery may be characterised by a long-last-
ing slow growth period and a decrease in the growth rate of 
potential GDP. (In order to quantify these trends, alternative 
simulations are necessary.) While a full rebound is theoreti-
cally possible, it seems highly unlikely.
As regards potential growth, the crisis and the period follow-
ing the crisis may bring further signifi cant changes such as a 
permanently higher level of structural unemployment, a per-
manent decrease in the rate of capital accumulation due to a 
Figure 3
Contribution of TFP to potential output growth
in %
Figure 4
Development of potential output growth in the EU10, 
1996-2016
in %
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